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COMMISSIONER BENJAMIN'S REPORT ON ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATION IN NEW YORK*

Gilbert H. Montague t

I

N his annual message to the New York Legislature in January,
1939, after recalling that at the 1938 election the people had rejected a proposal that would "freeze into the Constitution a rigid procedure" for "the judicial review of the facts as well as of the law of
virtually all decisions of administrative officers and agencies," 1 Governor Lehman announced: "Modification of procedure, if' needed,
should be undertaken only after careful study of each administrative
process on an individual basis. As part of my plan always to improve
and perfect the administrative branch of government, 1 intend to appoint a commissioner under the executive law to study the entire problem of administrative rulings." 2 On March 3, 1939, Governor Lehman appointed Robert M. Benjamin as commissioner under section 8
of the Executive Law "to study, examine and investigate the exercise
of quasi-judicial functions by any board, commission or department of
the State." 8
Working with a counsel and eight associate counsel, Commissioner
Benjamin investigated the administrative procedure of the various departments, boards and commissions of New York, studying statutes,
rules, regulations, annual and other reports of the agencies themselves,
supplemented by further descriptive material prepared by the agencies
at his request, and other published reports and studies. During his investigation Commissioner Benjamin directly observed the administrative procedure of these boards, commissions and departments in their
offices and hearing rooms, and also held public hearings and conferences in order to get the viewpoint of labor organizations, business or-

*

ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATION IN THE STATE OF NEW YoRK: Report to Hon.
Herbert H. Lehman, Governor of the State of New York, by Robert M. Benjamin as
Commissioner under Section 8 of the Executive Law, March, 1942, (hereinafter cited
as BENJAMIN REPoRT). For comment on this, see Mackey, Book Review, 7 JOHN
MARSHALL L. Q. 564 (1942); Fuchs, Book Review, 42 CoL L. REv. 1376 (1942);
Carr, "Administrative Adjudication in America," 58 L. Q. REv. 487 (1942).
Member of the J:i[ew York bar; A. B., A. M., LL.B., Harvard; author, BusiNESS COMPETITION AND THE LAW (1917); co-author, SOME LEGAL PHASES oF CORPORATE FINANCING, REORGANIZATION AND REGULATION (1917 and Supp.. 1931); BusiNESS CYCLES AND UNEMPLOYMENT (1923).-Ed.
1 BENJAMIN REPORT I.

t

2

Id.

1-2.

8

Id.

l.

1 943]

BENJAMIN REPORT

577

ganizations, bar associations and interested individuals.4 Regarding
each particular department, board and commission, Commissioner
Benjamin and his staff prepared a separate memorandum containing an
historical note, a detailed description of existing administrative procedure, a statement of the type of judicial review now available, and concluding with critical comment and recommendations.11 On these broad
foundations Commissioner Benjamin prepared his report, and submitted it to Governor Lehman in March, 1942.6 His detailed memoranda dealing separately with the various departments, boards and
commissions could not be completed for publication concurrently with
his report, but they were taken into account in the recommendations
contained in his report. 7
Administrative adjudication, says Commissioner Benjamin, poses
"the problem of reconciling, in the field of administrative action, democratic safeguards and standards of fair play with the effective conduct of government." He continues:
"On the part of the administrator there must be not merely an
intention to do justice, but an appreciation that justice is only half
done if the person dealt with cannot recognize it.
" .•. On the part of those with whom the administrator deals
there must be ... a willingness to cooperate in working harmoniously under procedures that may be less than perfect. . .• By and
large, the administrators themselves are as much interested in the
problems . . . as the public and the bar are interested. By and
large, I have found among the public and the bar an absence of
heat, an understanding of the difficulties, and a desire to approach
the problems constructively and objectively." 8
Commissioner .Benjamin concludes that "the existing system of
administrative adjudication and legislation and judicial review has
worked reasonably well and reasonably to the satisfaction of the pub'Id. z-5.
11 Id. 8.
6 Id. 369.
7 Id. 8, note 2.
8 Id. 9, IO. Administrative action in the state of New York, even in the sensitive
field of labor relations, has generated surprisingly little heat. See NEw YoRK STATE
JOINT LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE ON INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS, PRELIMINARY
REPORT (1939) {N. Y. Leg. Doc. 57); id., REPORT (1940) (N. Y. Leg. Doc. 57);
id. (1941) (N. Y. Leg. Doc. 51); id. (1942) (N. Y. Leg. Doc. 47).
In the federal field, however, debate between critics and defenders of administrative procedure has been unpleasantly acrimonious. For critics, see REPORT OF THE
PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT 67-69 (1937) (S.
Doc. 8, 75th Cong., 1st sess.), and accompanying letter of President Roosevelt, id:
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iii-iv; Reports of Special Committee on Administrative Law of Amer-ican Bar Association, 58 A. B. A. Rep. 407 (1933); 59 id. 539 (1934); 60 id. 136 (1935); 61 id.
720 (1936); 62 id. 789 (1937); 63 id. 331 (1938); 64 id. 281 (1939); 65 id. 215
(1940); 66 id. 143-144 (1941); Pound, "Modern Administrative Law," 51 VA. B.
A. PRoc. 372 at 382 (1939); Pot1ND, CONTEMPORARY Jt1Rimc THEORY (1940);
Pound, "The- Place of the Judiciary in a Democratic Polity," 27 A. B. A. J. • 133
( l 941) ; Pound and McGuire, "Administrative Procedure Reform Moves Forward,"
id. 150; Pound, "For the 'Minority Report'," id. 664 at 667-668; Pound, statement,
HEARINGS BEFoRE StrncoMMITrEE OF SENATE JumcIARY COMMITTEE on S. 674,
S. 675, and S. 918, 77th Cong., 1st sess. (1941), pt. 4, pp. 157er1584 (hereinafter
cited as S. HEARINGS); Bailey, "Dean Pound and Administrative Law-Another
View," 42 CoL. L. REv. 781 (1942).
For defenders of administrative procedure, see Message from the President of the
United States, Dec. 18, 1940, vetoing H. R. 6324, H. Doc. 986, 76th Cong., 3d
sess., pp. 2-4, and accompanying Letter of Attorney General Jackson, id. 5-12, reprinted 86 CoNG. REc. 13942 ff. (1940); and the following articles by Justice (then
Professor) Frankfurter: ''The Task of Administrative Law," 75 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 614
(1927); foreword preceding Jennings, "Courts and Administrative Law-The Experience of English Housing Legislation;" 49 HARV. L. REV. 426 (1936); foreword to
a discussion of current developments in administrative law, 47 YALE L. J. 515 at 517518 (1938}; Summation of the Conference, 24 A. B. A. J. 282 at 283, 285 (1938);
foreword to a symposium of the Report of the Attorney General's committee, 41 CoL.
L. REv. 585 (1941). See also LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 1-5, 47-48,
123, 136-140 (1938); Feller, "Prospectus for the Further Study of Federal 2\dministrative Law," 47 YALE L. J. 647 (1938}; Cooper, "Administrative Justice and the
Role of Discretion," 47 YALE L. J. 577 (1938); Gellhorn and Linfield, ''Politics and
Labor Relations: An Appraisal of Criticisms of NLRB Procedure," 39 CoL. L. REv.
339 (1939); Jaffe, "Invective and Investigation in Administrative Law," 53 HARV.
L. REv. 1201 (1939); GELLHORN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw: CAsEs AND COMMENTS 2,
5, 9 (1940); MacMahon, "The Ordeal of Administrative Law," 25 lowA L. REv.
425 at 435 (1940); Feller, "Administrative Procedure and the Public Interest-The
Results of Due Process," 25 WAsH. UNiv. L. Q. 308 at 310-312 (1940); Landis,
"Crucial Issues in Administrative Law," 53 HARV. L. REv. 1077 at 1078, 10891090 (1940); GELLHORN, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS' 1-3, II7-II8
(1941); Feller, "Administrative Law Investigation Comes of Age," 41 CoL. L. REv.
589 at 599-616 (1941); Jaffe, "The Report of the Attorney General's Committee
on Administrative Procedure," 8 UNIV. CHI. L. REv. 401 at 408, 427-429 (1941);
Horack, "Administrative Procedure: A Report and an Evaluation," 26 WASH. ,UNIV.
L. Q. 492 at 507 (1941); Hart, ''The Acheson Report: A Critique," 26 lowA L.
REv. 801 at 804-805, 818 (1941): Schoene, Book Review, 50 YALE L. J. 1499
(1941); Shulman testimony, S. HEARINGS, pt. 2, pp. 838-839, 848-849, 857; Davis,
"Dean Pound and Administrative Law," 42 CoL. L. REV. 89 (1942),
The elevated tone of the BENJAMIN REPORT and the REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL's CoMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE (1941) (S. Doc. 8, 77th
Cong., 1st sess.) (hereinafter cited as "REPORT OF ATTORNEY GENERAL'S CoMMITTEE'') may inspire more courtesy between critics and defenders of administrative
procedure. Jaffe, "The Reform of Federal Administrative Procedure," 2 PuB. ADM.
REV. 141 at r4z , ( I 942) ; Montague, "Reform of Administrative Procedure," 40
M1cH. L. REv. 501 at 503 (1942). See FRANK, IF MEN WERE ANGELS (1942), in
which Judge Frank of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit,
out of his experience as a former member and chairman of the Securities and Exchange
Commission, shows more willingness than many defenders of administrative procedure
to meet criticism. Id. 140-146.

BENJAMIN REPORT

579

lie," but he believes that "in many respects the existing system can be
improved." 9
The proposal that there should be a code of procedure analogous
to the Civil Practice Act to bring about some uniformity in administrative adjudication and to provide some guidance to the persons affected
is dismissed by Commissioner Benjamin because of the diversity of
position which the state occupies in proceedings before various boards,
commissions and departments,1° and because of the diversity in the
mode of initiating proceedings,u and the diversity in the mode of
specifying the issues,12 and the diversity in the mode of conducting
hearings.18 Uniform procedure, Commissioner Benjamin believes, is
neither feasible nor desirable,14 and responsibility for satisfactory procedure should be placed on the administrator charged with the operation of the procedure, and "legislation should not go too far in filling
in procedural details." 15
Proceeding to the question of separation of the functions involved
in quasi-judicial action, Commissioner Benjamin states that "The doctrine of the separation of powers has never been ... a dogmatic rule." 16
"Neither, on the other hand," he continues, "has the objection that a
9

REPORT IO.
Id. 24-29, citing Board of Standards and Appeals, Department of Labor, Bureau
of Motor Vehicles, Public Service Commission, Water Power and Control Commission,
Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board, State Labor Relations Act, State Tax Commission, Department of Agriculture, Medical Grievance Committee, Board of Regents.
11
Id. 29-30, citing Alcoholic Beverage Control Law, Insurance Law and State
Labor Relations Act.
12
Id. 30-34, citing State Labor Relations Board, Bureau of Motor Vehicles,
Unemployment Insurance, Public Service Commission.
13
Id. 34-35.
14
Id. 35-36.
15
Id. 37-38, citing with approval the recently revised Insurance Law, id. 38, 41.
The minority of the Attorney General's Committee recommended legislative statements of policy, principles and standards for the guidance of administrators. REPORT
OF ATTORNEY GENERAL'S C.oMMITTEE 214-215. See also Dulles, "The Effect in
Practice of the Report on Administrative Procedure," 41 CoL. L. REv. 617 at 626
(1941); Dulles testimony, S. HEARINGS, pt. 3, pp. u48-u49. This proposal was disapproved by the majority of the Attorney General's Committee on the ground that
general provisions will be merely hortatory and that particular provisions for particular
agencies should be based on prolonged agency-by-agency study. REPORT OF ATTORNEY
GENERAL'S COMMITTEE 191-192. See also Biddle testimony, S. HEARINGS, pt. 3, pp.
1438-1440; Feller, "Administrative Law Investigation Comes of Age," 41 CoL. L.
REV. 589 at 608-609 (1941); Davison, "Administrative Technique-The Report on
Administrative Procedure," 41 CoL. L. REv. 628 at 640-641 (1941); Hart, "The
Acheson Report: A Critique," 26 IowA L. REv. 801 at 817-818 (1941).
16
BENJAMIN REPORT 45, citing THE FEDERALIST Nos. 47, 48, 51 (1788);
also Village of Saratoga Springs v. Saratoga Gas, Electric Light & Power Co., 191
BENJAMIN

10

N. Y. 123, 83 N. E. 693 (1908).
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separation of functions would unduly impair administrative responsibility and effectiveness been universally operative. Separation of
functions among different agenies exists....,m
Applying these conclusions to the Department of Labor, Commissioner Benjamin recommends that the functions of the present State
Labor R-elations Board be divided between two boards
" ..• independent of each other, each consisting of three members appointed by the Governor, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, and removable by the Governor for cause. The
terms of office of the members of each board would be staggered
•.. so that ... both boards should be made up, in the same proportions, of appointees of the same appointing power. . .. I recommend that one of the new boards ( which I suggest calling the
Stat~ Labor Relations Board) should have the function of adjudication in unfair labor-practice cases, and in representation cases
should have the functions of adjudication (including the adjudication of objections to the conduct of elections) and formal certification of bargaining representatives; and that the other board
( which I suggest calling the State Labor Relations Authority)
should exercise all other functions, including the investigation of
charges with respect to unfair labor practices and of controversies
conc~rning the representation of employees, the negotiation of
voluntary adjustments of alleged violations of the Act, the determination whether or not to issue complaints with respect to alleged
unfair labor practices and the issuance of such complaints, the
litigation of unfair labor practice cases before the Board, the supervision of voluntary agreements relating to the selection of bargaining representatives, the presentation of evidence or argument
at hearings before the Board in representation cases where that is
necessa11; to supplement the presentation by the other parties, the
17 BENJAMIN REPORT 45-47, citing in the Department of Labor the Board of
Standards and Appeals (three members) and the Industrial Commissioner, each independent of the other in appointment, compensation and tenure, each appointed by
the governor with the advice and consent of the Senate, and all removable by the governor, the board being empowered to- review the validity or reasonableness of any rule
or order under the Labor Law; also citing the Unemployme~t Insurance Appeal Board,
appointed by the governor for fixed terms, and removable only by the governor, and
the unemployment insurance referees, appointed by the industrial commissioner subject
to the Civil Service Law, but "under the Appeal Board's 'supervision, direction and
administrative control.' The referees and the Appeal Board review determinations
made in the first instance by the Division of Placement and Unemployment Insurance
of the Department of Labor, with regard both to claims for benefits and to the liability
of employers for contributions to the unemployment insurance fund. On occasion the
Industrial Commissioner, through the Division, actively participates as a party in hearings before the referees or the Appeal Board." Id. 47.
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conduct of elections ( whether held on consent or by direction of
the Board), and the litigation of all enforcement and other proceedings in court. The allocation of staff would follow corresponding lines, the Board's staff to include trial examiners and
other personnel necessary to assist it in adjudication, the Authority's staff to include trial attorneys and other personnel necessary
to assist it in its varied functions." 18
The reasoning by which Commissioner Benjamin arrives at this
recommendation deserves analysis.19
To the objection that "separation of functions would unduly impair
administrative responsibility and effectiveness," Commissioner Benjamin answers that this is cogent as regards an agency like the Public
Service Commission and the Insurance Department engaged in the
continuing regulation of a field of industrial or business activity, but is
not cogent as regards the State Labor Relations Board, which is not
administrative in that sense but is simply a litigating and adjudicating
agency to determine whether an employer has violated the act, or to
determine who is entitled to represent the employees in collective bargaining.20
18 BENJAMIN REPORT 48-49. Proposals analogous to this have been endorsed by
the minority of the Attorney General's Committee and many others. REPORT OF THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE 203-209, 248-250. See also REPORT. OF THE
PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT 67-71 (1937); COMMITTEE oN M1N1STERS' PowERS REPORT 73-79, 88-100, u5-u6 (1932) (Cmd.
4060); HENDERSON, THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 83-84, 327-329 (1924);
LASKI, A GRAMMAR OF PoLITics 129-130 (1925); DicKINSoN,"'-ADMINISTRATIVE
JUSTICE AND THE SUPREMACY OF LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 252-253 (1927);
Dulles, "The Effect in Practice of the Report on Administrative Procedure," 41 CoL.
L. REV. 617 at 621-625 (1941); See also Dulles testimony, S. HEARINGS, pt. 3, pp.
1152-n56; Groner testimony, id. 1361 et seq.; FRANK, IF MEN WERE ANGELS
140-146, 250 (1942); Dickinson, "The Acheson Report: A Novel Approach to
Administrative Law," 90 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 757 (1942).
Proposals analogous to this have been opposed by the majority of the Attorney
General's Committee and many others. REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S CoMMITTEE 55-60; LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS (1938); Jaffe, "Invective and
Investigation in Administrative Law," 52 HARV. L. REV. 1201 (1939); Landis,
"Crucial Issues in Administrative Law," 53 HARV. L. REV. 1077 (1940); GELLHOR."f,
FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS (1941); Feller, "Administrative Law Investigation Comes of Age," 41 CoL. L. REv. 589 (1941); Jaffe, "The Report of the
Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure," 8 UNiv. Cm. L. REV.
401 (1941); Schoene, Book Review, 50 YALE L. J. 1499 (1941).
19 For an extensive compilation of the authorities and arguments pro and con
upon this subject, see Montague, "Reform of Administrative Procedure," 40 M1cH.
L. REv. 501 at 516-527 (1942).
20 BENJAMIN REPORT 49-50. " ... policy," says Commissioner Benjamin, "plays
a proper, and often a necessary, part ••• in interpreting a statute which the adminis-
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To the objection that "separate agencies might be in such conflict on
questions of policy in the interpretation and enforcement of the Act as
t~ cause a breakdown in effective enforcement," Commissioner Benjamin answers that complete agreement on all questions of policy is not
"necessarily desirable," and that conflict to the point of impeding effective enforcement will be avoided by creating two boards each of
three members appointed in the manner he suggests.21 This also is his
answer to the objection that by withholding cases from litigation, or by
litigating too many cases, a separate litigating agency may frustrate or
clog or otherwise control enforcement policy.22
Negotiating voluntary adjustments, Commissioner Benjamin believes, will be facilitated by separating that function from the adjudicating function, and there will then be eliminated the pressure now
implicit in negotiations conducted by the adjudicating agency.28
Experience with the Board of Standards and Appeals, the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board, and the Industrial Board ( the
final quasi-judicial authority in workmen's compensation) convinces
Commissioner Benjamin that a separate adjudicating agency can attain
an understanding of the realities without exercising the prosecuting
function, and will not tend to become legalistic or unrealistic in interpreting and developing the act. 24
To the objection that if the adjudicating function is to be separated
from the prosecuting function it might as well be left to the courts,
Commissioner Benjamin answers that
"· .. a more coherent and consistent interpretation and development of a statute such as the Labor Relations Act will grow out
of initial adjudication in every case by a single tribunal, which constantly deals with related questions, than would be possible- if
initial adjudication were by a diversity of courts .... adjudication
under the Act calls . . . for expertness, in the sense of familiarity
trator is charged with enforcing, or in determining the penalty that should be imposed
for a particular offense, or in determining the course of action that the administrator
should follow, or require to be followed, on the basis of facts properly found. But
policy should play no part in the decision of questions of fact; policy, rightly understood, cannot call for the decision of a question of fact in a particular way." Id. 22-23.
Gommissioner Benjamin disapproves, see id. 22, a passage quoted from CoMMITrEE
ON MINISTERS' POWERS REPORT 78 (1932), but this may be due to a misapprehension, for the context indicates that the passage refers only to a litigating and adjudicating agency's determination of questions of fact. See id. 73-79, 93-99, II5-II6.
21 BENJAMIN REPORT 50-51.
22 Id. 51.
2s Id. 51-53.
24 Id. 53.
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with history and present practice in the field of labor relations,
which is most likely to be achieved by a board constantly engaged
in such adjudication." 25
"· .. such expertness also involves a risk that the tribunal,
familiar with evils that sometimes exist in a field, may find such
evils where they do not in fact exist. But that risk can easily be
avoided by a tribunal aware of it and aware of its own responsibilities; and in my judgment the advantages of expertness outweigh this possible disadvantage.m 6
Nor can internal separation of functions accomplish the object of
two independent boards, in Commissioner Benjamin's opinion, for it
cannot "properly go as far as the separation that I recommend between
the proposed Authority and the proposed adjudicating board. The
functions that I recommend assigning to the proposed Authority are
of too great consequence to be assigned to subordinates unless supervision and ultimate control are left in more responsible hands." 21
To the proposal that "all hearings be conducted by trial examiners
appointed by, and subject to removal only by, some agency independent of the Board," Commissioner Benjamin answers:
" ... If the decisions of such independent trial examiners were,
as is sometimes suggested, given :finality (subject only to judicial
review), the change would be not merely a change in internal organization; the trial examiners would constitute an independent
adjudicating agency, but without the advantages of consistent adjudication that would be afforded by the unified independent adjudicating Board which I recommend. If, on the other hand, the
decisions of such trial examiners were not given :finality, the
change in internal organization would not go far enough towards
accomplishing the purposes of a separation of functions. The existence of the Board's ultimate power to review and reverse would,
even if it were not frequently exercised, tend to impair the confidence in impartial adjudication which it is a primary purpose of
the separation of functions to foster. In any case where the Board
actually reversed a decision of the trial examiner favorable to the
respondent, the very fact of the trial examiner's independence
would aggravate the objection to the Board's duality of function." 28
211

Id. 53-54.
Id. 54, note I 2.
27
Id. 64, and see also 63-65.
28 Id. 6 5-66. Trial examiners independent of the agency were recommended by
the majority and minority of the Attorney General's Committee, see REPORT OF
26
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As regards the expense of a State Labor Relations Board separate
from a State Labor Relations Authority, Commissioner Benjamin says:

" ... If the cost of setting up the proposed three-man Authority is thought to be excessive in relation to the benefits to be realized, it would be better, in my judgment, to continue the present
unitary structure of the Board rather than to set up in place of the
Authority an agency headed by an individual, which, while it
would cost less, would involve the particular disadvantages that
I have noted." 29 Commissioner Benjamin's basic reason for assigning to a State
Labor Relations Authority the present prosecuting function of the State
Labor Relations Board is that these functions, as now combined in the
present board,
"· •• may, through creating the appearance of prejudgment
and bias, impair that confidence and cooperation on the part of
those with whom the administrator deals which the most effective
and successful administration requires. The administrator's own
recognition of his dual position tends, in proportion to his conscientiousness and his appreciation of the importance of procedure
fair in appearance as well as in substance, to create a self-consciousness that interferes with the expeditious and effective performance
of his quasi-judicial duties." so
"The Labor Relations Board," Commissioner Benjamin continues, "operates in a field in which strong feelings are still involved. It is charged with the enforcement of legal rights and
obligations only recently secured or created by statute, and not yet
fully accepted by all those with whom the Board deals. . . • It is
ATI'ORNEY GENERAL'S CoMMI'ITEE 45-55, 208, 248-250, but were opposed by several
federal agencies. See Federal Trade Commission statement (Woode11), S. HEARINGS,
pt. 1, 303-304, 307; Interstate Commerce Commission (Aitchison), id. 451-452. See
also Horack, "Administrative Procedure; A Report and an Evaluation," 26 WASH.
UNIV, L. Q. 492 at 499-500 (1941); Jaffe, "The Report of the Attorney General's
Committee on Administrative Procedure," 8 UNIV. CHI. L. REV. 401 at 41.1-428
(1941); Hart, ''The Acheson Report: A Critique," 26 IowA L. REV. 801 at 8n-814
(1941); Schoene, Book Review, 50 YALE L. J. 1499 at 1503-1504 (1941); Davison,
"Administrative Technique---The Report on Administrative Procedure," 41 CoL. L.
REV. 628 at 633-636 (1941); Dulles, "The Effect in Practice of the Report on
Administrative Procedure," 41 CoL. L. REV. 617 at 621-625 (1941); see also Dnlles
testimony, S. HEARINGS, pt. 3, pp. n52-n56; Dickinson, "The Acheson Report: A
Novel Approach to Administrative Law," 90 UNtv. PA. L. REv. 757 (1942).
29 BENiAMIN REPORT 55. See also id. 54-55, 62.
30 Id. 55. For an example of this in Judge Frank's experience while he was a
member and Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission, see FRANK, IF
MEN WERE ANGELS 120-1;22, 140-147, 250 (1942).
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called upon often to decide difficult and delicate questions of fact,
such as the question of the motive of an employer alleged to have
discharged an employee for union activity--questions not only
difficult and delicate, but of a character such that the absence of
prejudgment or bias in adjudication cannot be the subject of convincing demonstration. In these circumstances all the advantages
of dividing between di:fferent agencies the functions of litigation
and adjudication are emphasized." 31
Commissioner Benjamin is emphatic, however, that the circumstances favoring a separation of this board's adjudicating and prosecuting functions "are comparatively infrequent," and do not exist in agencies like the Public Service Commission, which operate in "fields traditionally within the legislative or executive power" and are charged
with the "continuing regulation of a field of industrial and business
activity." 82
Investigation, specification of the issues, notice, opportunity to be
heard, the conduct of hearings, the behavior of the hearing officer and
other representatives of the agency, the representation of outside parties, and all the elements of the hearing procedure, Commissioner
Benjamin reviews with specific suggestions to guide the administrator
in particular cases.33 Instead of empowering an administrative agency
to punish for contumacy or itself to enforce compliance, he would afford the agency a more expedited procedure for applying to the court
to do these things. M
He summarizes the statutes governing the issuance, service and enforcement of subpoenas and subpoenas duces tecum by various agencies,
and approves the policy of the New York decisions that, in the absence
of explicit legislation to the contrary, an outside party is entitled to the
issuance of ordinary subpoenas without disclosing to the agency the
names of witnesses or the character of the testimony sought from
them.85
He summarizes the New Yark decisions that the exclusionary rules
of evidence are not legally binding in agency proceedings even when
the statute does not provide that the rules of evidence shall not control.86 He compares the "legal residuum" rule 37 with the "substantial
31

BENJAMIN REPORT

55-56.

83

Id. 71-132.
Id. 67-68.
Id. 132-134.
35
Id. 147-166, citing Matter of Coney Island Dairy Products Corp. v. Baldwin,
243 App. Div. 178, 276 N. Y. S. 682 (1935).
86 BENJAMIN REPORT 171-181.
87
Carroll v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 218 N. Y. 435, 113 N. E. 507 (1916).
32

84

586
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evidence" rule,38 and expresses his preference for the latter.89 He sum. marizes the decisions on cross-examination,40 and the decisions holding
that where a hearing is prescribed by statute nothing must be taken into
account by the ·agency that has not been introduced in some manner
into the record of the hearing.41
Sometimes the volume of hearings, says Commissioner Benjamin,
requires that "power of final decision be vested in a considerable number of referees or other like hearing officers, perhaps subject to administrative review discretionary with the reviewing body." 42 Sometimes
"the hearing officer may be given power (perhaps with the concurrence
of some other officer) to decide finally in favor of the outside party,
while a final decision against the outside party can be made only by
the head of the agency or other superior officer.;' 48 Often it is "clearly
impracticable for deciding officers to read and analyze all or even a
major part of the record in cases that they must decide." 44 Reversing
for want of proper findings a determination of the Commissioner of
Agriculture and Markets denying_ an application for a milk dealer's
license, the New York Court of Appeals has held that though the
statute authorized delegation of the power to conduct hearings, it required the commissioner himself to make the formal decision. Holding
that where the determination of the commissioner is adverse to the
applicant there must be "findings which will show the particular matter determined against him," the court said:
" ... That determination must be made by the Commissioner,
though in reaching it, practical considerations may lead .him to rely
rather upon the report or memorandum of the Director of Milk
Control or other officer or employee than upon independent examination of the testimony produced at the hearing."· 45
The process of decision, the "examiner-report" procedure, the con40 Id. 194-206.
ss BENJAMIN REPORT 181-194.
41 Id. 206-221.
Id. 192-193.
_
42 Id. 223, citing workmen's compensation and motor vehicle license revocation
proceedings.
48 Id. 224-225, citing Board of Regents and Medical Grievance Committee;
State Liquor Authority and its members and its chief executive officer; State Tax
Commission and various officers of the Income Tax ,Bureau.
44 Id. 227, citing State Labor Relations Board, deciding in a year cases aggregating
55,000 typed pages exclusive of exhibits; Public Service Commission deciding in a
year cases. aggregating 69,000 pages exclusive of exhibits; and State_ Liquor Authority,
deciding in a year 362 license revocation cases.
45 Elite Dairy Products v. Ten Eyck, 271 N. Y. 488 at 498, 3 N. E. (2d) 606
(1936), quoted in BENJAMIN REPORT 248-249. Commissioner Benjamin also cites
New York Water Service Corp. v. Water Power & Control Commission, 283 N. Y.
89
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tent and form of the decision, its publication and enforcement, advisory
rulings, the selection and training of quasi-judicial personnel, the procedure for formulating quasi-legislative regulations, their filing and
publication, Commissioner Benjamin reviews with specific suggestions
to guide the administrator in particular cases.46
Decisions of the Court of Appeals, Commissioner Benjamin concludes, "hold that the scope of review of determinations of fact is the
same whatever the language of the particular review statute, and that
the uniform rule as to the scope of such review is the 'substantial
evidence' rule." 41 Thus, under a statute providing that findings of the
23, 27 N. E. (2d) 221 (1940). Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S. 468, 56 S. Ct.
906 (1936), decided several weeks before the Elite Dairy decision, is clearly in confilct with it, but is not mentioned therein. In Joyce v. Bruckman, 257 App. Div.
795 at 797, 15 N. Y. S. (2d) 679 (1939), a determination of the State Liquor
Authority r~voking a liquor license was annulled on the ground that five commissioners
acting as a judicial board could not make a determination "when four of them concededly knew nothing of the facts on which the determination was based, excepting
what they were told by the fifth member." Here the court cited the Morgan decision
but not the Elite Dairy decision. Commissioner Benjamin concedes the conflict between
the Elite Dairy decision and the Morgan de_cision, but states: "The Morgan cases [i.e.,
Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S. 468, 56 S. Ct. 906 (1936), Morgan v. United
States, 304 U.S. 1, 58 S. Ct. 773 (1938), rehearing denied with opinion 304 U.S.
23, 58 S. Ct. 999 (1938), United States v. Morgan, 307 U.S. 183, 59 S. Ct. 795
(1939), and United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 61 S. Ct. 999 (1941)] were
decided not on the ground of due process but on the ground of statutory construction
of the provision for a 'full hearing' in the statute there considered; they are therefore
not of binding effect on the courts of this State." BEN.JAMIN REPORT 248.
For an extensive compilation of the comments pro and con the Morgan cases,
see Montague, "Reform of Administrative Procedure," 40 M1cH. L. REv. 501 at
507-508, note 22 {1942). The majority and minority of the Attorney General's
Committee, without mentioning any of these decisions, were both emphatic that
"review should be given by the officials charged with the responsibility for it, and
the review so given should include a personal Jl!astery of at least the portions of the
records embraced within the exceptions. In agencies headed by a board, commission
or authority, further division of labor may be necessary to provide the time for individual attention by the agency heads. . •• In single headed departments and agencies
••• all pretense of consideration of each case by the agency head [should] be abandoned and ••• there [should] be cre!lted either boards of review, as in immigration
procedure, or chief deciding officers who shall exercise the final power of decision.
But if the agency head in these departments does review a case, he must assume the
burden of personal decision." REPORT OF A-rroRNEY GENERAL'S CoMMI'ITEE 52-53.
See also dissenting opinion of Clark, J., in National Labor Relations Board v. Baldwin
Locomotive Works, (C. C. A. 3d, 1942) 128 F. (2d) 39 at 60-65. For an extensive
compilation of the authorities and arguments pro and con on this subject, see Montague, supra, at 505-sz6.
46 BENjAMIN REPORT 221-325.
41 Id. 328, citing Stork Restaurant v. Boland, 282 N. Y. 256, 26 N. E. (2d)
247 (1940), and Weber v. Town of Cheektowaga, 284 N. Y. 377, 31 N. E. (2d)
495 (1940).
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State Labor Relations Board "as to the facts, if supported by evidence,
shall be conclusive," the Court of Appeals held
" ... The evidence produced by one party must be considered
in connection with the evidence produced by the other parties.
Evidence which unexplained might be conclusive may lose all probative force when supplemented and explained by other testimony.
The Board ·must consider and sift all the evidence-accepting the
true and rejecting the false-and must base inferences on what it
has accepted as true. Choice lies with the Board and its finding is
supported by the evidence and is conclusive where others might
reasonably make the same choice." 48
"The substantial evidence test," says Commissioner Benjamin, "as
defined by the Stork Restaurant case, is thus a test of the rationality of
a quasi-judicial determination, taking into account all the evidence on
both sides." 49
The Civil Practice Act, section 1296, listing the questions to be
determined by the reviewing court in certiorari proceedings under
article 78, which is the review procedure applicable to the great majority of administrative agencies of the State of New York, provides:
"In a proceeding under this article, the questions involving
48 Stork Restaurant v. Boland, 282 N. Y. 256 at 274, 26 N. E. (2d) 247 (1940),
quoted in BENJAMIN REPORT 329.
49 BENJAMIN REPORT 329. This differs from the "substantial evidence" rule
debated by the majority and minority of the Attorney General's Committee, under
which, as the minority complained, "the courts need to read only one side of the case,
and if they find any evidence there, the administrative action is to be sustained and
the record to the contrary is to be ignored.» REPORT OF ATTORNEY GENERAL'S
COMMITTEE 2II. The trend of decisions in the Supreme Court of the United States
and other federal courts is now to narrow the review. For an extensive compilation
of decisions, see Montague, "Reform.of Administrative Procedure," 40 M1cH. L. REV.
501 at 533, note 98 (1942). See also Dickinson, "Judicial Review of Administrative
Determinations: A Summary and Evaluation," 25 MINN. L. REV. 588 (1941); Dickinson, "Administrative Management, Administrative Regulation and the Judicial Process," 89 Umv. PA. L. REV. 1052 (1941); Dickinson, "The Acheson Report: A
Novel Approach to Administrative Law," 90 Umv. PA. L. REv. 757 (1942).
"Under existing standards," the majority of the Attorney General's Committee
declared, "the courts may narrow their review to satisfy the demands for administrative
discretion, and they may broaden it close to the point of substituting their judgment
for that of the administrative agency." REPORT OF ATTORNEY GENERAL'S CoMMITTEE
91. The -majority of the Attorney General's Committee believed that no legislation
is now needed, and that "Only by addressing itself to particular situations, and not by
general legislation for all agencies and all types of determinations alike, can Congress
make effective and desirable change." Id. 92. • For an extensive compilation of the
authorities and arguments pro and con upon this subject, see Montague, supra, at
533-536.
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the merits to be determined upon the hearing are the following
only ...
"6. Whether there was any competent proof of all the facts
necessary to be proved in order to authorize the making of the
determination.
"7. If there was such proof, whether, upon all the evidence,
there was such a preponderance of proof against the existence of
any of those facts that the verdict of a jury, affirming the existence
thereof, rendered in an action in the supreme court triable by a
jury, would be set aside by the court as against the weight of evidence."
Commissioner Benjamin states that the Court of Appeals "has construed subdivision 7 to mean that a quasi-judicial determination may be
set aside only where, upon the same evidence, a jury verdict would
necessarily be set aside, as a matter of law, i.e., where a contrary verdict might properly have been directed. . .. The scope of review under
subdivision 7, so construed, is the same as the scope of review under the
substantial evidence rule." 50 Accordingly, Commissioner Benjamin
recommends amending present subdivisions 6 and 7 ( and the paragraph
introductory thereto) so as to read
"Where the determination under review was made as the result of a hearing held, and at which evidence was taken, pursuant
to statutory direction, the following question shall also be determined:
"6. Whether, upon the entire record of the hearing, each of
the findings of fact necessary to support the determination is itself
supported by substantial evidence." 51
Commissioner Benjamin concluded that it is not desirable to
broaden or narrow the scope of review beyond that represented by the
substantial evidence rule:
" ... The interests of the parties require, I believe, that quasijudicial determinations of fact be subjected at least to the test of
rationality which the substantial evidence rule provides, both be50 BENJAMIN REPORT 331, 332, citing numerous decisions, including Weber v.
Town of Cheektowaga, 284 N. Y. 377, 31 N.E. (2d) 495 (1940); People ex rel.
Guiney v. Valentine, 274 N. Y. 331, 8 N. E. (2d) 880 (1937); Roge v. Valentine,
280 N. Y. 268, 20 N. E. (2d) 751 (1939-); Stork Restaurant v. Boland, 282 N. Y.
256, 26 N. E. (2d) 247 (1940); Dusinberre v. Noyes, 284 N. Y. 304, 31 N. E.
(2d) 34 (1940); Murphy v. Valentine, 284 N. Y. 524, 32 N. E. (2d) 537 (1940);
Newbrand v. City of Yonkers, 285 N. Y. 164, 33 N. E. (2d) 75 (1941).
n BENJAMIN REPORT 339.

59°

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41

cause review of this scope affords a means of correcting abuses in
individµal cases and because the cautionary effect of the prospect
of such review should help to assure proper administrative adjudication in the first instance. The existence of factors ( considered
in my discussion of quasi-judicial procedure) that may tend towards bias or prejudgment in administrative adjudication adds
force to this conclusion. So does the circumstance that often the
quasi-judicial decision is made by one who has not seen the witnesses or heard their testimony and that the decision may, indeed,
be contrary to the recommendation of the hearing officer who did
hear the testimony. Approaching the problem from the other side,
my observation convinces me that review as broad as under the
substantial evidence rule is entirely consistent with effective administration." 52
"Decisions of the New York Courts," Commissioner Benjamin observes, indicate that "no broader scope of review will be applied to
determinations of 'jurisdictional fact' (however defined) than to other
factual determinations." 53
52 Id. 338-339. "My view;' says Commissioner Benjamin, "that it is not desirable
that the reviewing court be permitted to substitute its judgment for a rational judgment of the administrative tribunal is not based solely on the assumption that an
administrative tribunal is especially qualified to arrive at correct determinations of fact
in the field in which it operates. Often that is so, but I recognize that the ideal is
not always realized in practice. Nor is my view based solely on the argument (which
I believe to be sound) that satisfactory administrative adjudication is more likely to
result where a reasonable degree of responsibility is imposed on the administrative
judge than where supervision is carried too far. At least as important as either of these
considerations i_s a consideration applicable to those fields ( the most numerous) where
adjudication is only one part of a larger administrative process. Unless an administrative
agency operating in such a field is permitted to act on the basis of its own adjudication,
when that adjudication is rationally supportable, the whole process of administration
will be unduly impeded." Id. 337-338. See also FRANK, IF MEN WERE ANGELS
179-189 (1942).
.
53 BENJAMIN REPORT 340, citing Matter of Dimino v. Independent Warehouses,
284 N. Y. 481 at 484, 31 N. E. (2d) 911 (1940), cert. denied Independent Warehouses v. Dimino, 313 U.S. 569, 61 S. Ct. 946 (1941) (determination that deceased
workman was not engaged at the time of his injury in a maritime service on navigable
waters); Miles v. Colegrove, 258 App. Div. 1014, 16 N. Y. S. (2d) 988 (1940),
affd. without opinion 284 N. Y. 609, 29 N. E. (2d) 924 (1940) (determination that
workmen's compensation claimant was not a farm laborer) ; Matter of Morton, 284
N. Y. 167, 30 N. E. (2d) 369 (1940) (determination that unemployment insurance
benefit claimant was an employee rather than an independent contractor). These New
York decisions are clearly in conflict with Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough,
253 U.S. 287, 40 S. Ct. 527 (1920); Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 52 S. Ct.
285 (1932); St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38, 56 S. Ct.
720 (1936), but the authority of these three decisions of the Supreme Court of the
United States is now threatened by Railroad Commission of Texas v. Rowan & Nichols
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Commissioner Benjamin's outstanding recommendation is a continuing investigation of administrative procedure by a Division of
Administrative Procedure created in the Executive Department, and
headed by a Director of Administrative Procedure appointed by the
Governor.54, This director with two assistants and a small stenographic
and clerical force, beginning upon the foundations of Commissioner
Benjamin's report and his accompanying detailed memoranda on the
various departments, boards and commissions of the state, can continue
to study the procedure of each of these administrative agencies, and can
furnish expert assistance to each agency. It can receive from the public
complaints and suggestions regarding procedure, can assist in an advisory capacity in correcting conflicts and overlapping jurisdiction in the
procedure of different agencies, and can administer the legislation
called for by the state constitution for the publication of rules and
regulations of these administrative agencies. It can report to the Governor annually or more frequently on the results of the director's work,
and can recommend any legislation that he thinks desirable.55 A somewhat similar recommendation for an Office of Federal Administrative
Procedure was made by both the majority and minority of the Attorney
General's Committee on Administrative Procedure,56 and has proved to
be the most popular recommendation emanating from that committee.57
There is sound basis for these recommendations. Administrative
procedure has always benefited from official investigations. Some investigators have been highly critical, such as the President's Committee on Administrative Management,5 8 and the majority of the Special
Oil Co., 310 U.S. 573, 60 S. Ct. 1021 (1940) (opinion amended 311 U.S. 614,
61 S. Ct. 66), 3u U.S. 570, 61 S. Ct. 343 (1941). See comment on this decision
by the minority of the Attorney General's Committee. REPORT OF AnoRNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE 210. See also Dickinson, "Judicial Review of Administrative
Determinations: A Summary and Evaluation," 25 MxNN. L. REv. 588 (1941);
Dickinson, "Administrative Management, Administrative Regulation and the Judicial
Process," 89 UNIV, PA. L. REv. 1052 (1941); Dickinson, "The Acheson.Report: A
Novel Approach to Administrative Law," 90 UNiv. PA. L. REv. 757 (1942).
H BENJAMIN REPORT 18.
55
56

Id. 18-21.

REPORT OF ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE 6 (1941).
See S. HEARINGS 437 (Aitchison), 866 (Davison), 1333 (McFarland), 1427
(Biddle}, 1496 (Biddle). See also Dulles, "The Effect in Practice of the Report on
Administrative Procedure," 41 CoL. L. REv. 617 at 618-619 (1941); Davison,
"Administrative Technique-The Report on Administrative Procedure," 41 CoL. L.
REv. 628 at 643 (1941); Jaffe, "The Report of the Attorney General's Committee
on Administrative Procedure," 8 UNiv. CHI. L. REv. 401 at 439-440 (1941); Hart,
"The Acheson Report: A Critique," 26 IowA L. REv. 801 at 807-808 (1941).
58
REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT
67-69 (1937), and accompanying Letter of President Roosevelt, id. iii-iv. See
57
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Committee of the House of Representatives that investigated the National Labor Relations Board/9 Others have been more sympathetic,
such as the Committee on Ministers' Powers in Great Britain,6° the
Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure,61 and
now Commissioner Benjamin. But whether critical or sympathetic,
PENNOCK, ADMINISTRATION AND THE RULE OF LAW 20, 74, 222 (1941); CUSHMAN,
THE INDEPENDENT REGULATORY CoMMISSIONS 412-413, 700, 709-714, 725 (1941).
Compare WILLOUGHBY, PRINCIPLES OF LEGISLATIVE ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION (1934); BLACHLY AND OATMAN, ADMINISTRATIVE LEGISLATION AND ADJUDICATION (1934).
59
Special Committee of the House of Representatives to Investigate the National
Labor Relations Board and the Operation of the National Labor Relations Act under
H. Res. 258, 76th Cong. 1st sess. (1939-1940); id. Intermediate Report, H. REP.
1902, 76th Cong., 3d sess. (1940); id. Final Report, H. REP. 3109, 76th Cong.,
3d sess. (1941), pt. 1.
6
° COMMITTEE ON MINISTERS' PowERS REPORT (1932). Some of the members
of this committee are listed in Montague, "Reform of Administrative Procedure," 40
M1cH. L. REv. 501 at 518, note 50 (1942). Critical publications and events that led
to the appointment of this committee are discussed passim in authorities cited in
note 8, supra, and in Montague, supra, at 520 note, 523 note; also PoRT, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw (1929), with foreword by Justice Sankey; Robson, "The Report of the
Committee on Ministers' Powers," 3 PoL. Q. 346 (1932); PENNOCK, ADMINISTRATION AND THE RULE OF LAW (1941); CUSHMAN, THE INDEPENDENT REGULATORY
COMMISSIONS 630-633, 702 (1941).
61
REPORT OF ATTORNEY GENERAL'S CoMMITTEE (1941). The committee's
membership is given in Montague, "Reform of Administrative Procedure," 40 M1cH.
L. REV. 501, at note l (1942). See remarks of Chief Justice Groner, S. HEARINGS,
pt. 3, p. 1362, quoted in Montague, supra at 505, note 13. Critical publications and
events that led to the appointment of this committee are discussed passim in the
authorities cited in note 8 above and in Montague, supra, at 502, note 7, 503, note
IO, 505, note 13, 540, note 123. For extracts from and comments upon the Attorney
General's Committee, see passim all the authorities cited in this note; also BLACHLY
and OATMAN, FEDERAL REGULATORY AcTioN AND CONTROL (1940); PENNOCK,
ADMINISTRATION AND THE RULE OF LAW (1941); CUSHMAN, THE INDEPENDENT
REGULATORY CoMMISSIONS (1941); "Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure--Majority and Minority Reports," 27 A. B. A. J. 91 (1941); Editorial, id. 9 5; Administrative Law Symposium, id. I 33-15 3, 207-2 II; Biddle, "Administrative Procedure Legislation," id. 660; Pound, "For the 'Minority Report',"
id. 664; Editorial, id. 686; GELLHORN, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS
(1941); CARR, CoNCERNING ENGLISH ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (1941); Dickinson,
"Judicial Review of Administrative Determinations: A Summary and Evaluation," 25
MINN. L. REV. 588 (1941); Dickinson, "Administrative Management, Administrative Regulation and the Judicial Process," 89 UNiv. PA. L. REv. 1052 (1941);
Lobingier, "The Acheson Committee and the S. E. C. Trial Examiners," 30 GEo.
L. J. l (1941); Administrative Procedure Bills, 8 I. C. C. PRACT. J. 808 (1941);
FRANK, IF MEN WERE ANGELS (1942); Dickinson, "The Acheson Report: A Novel
Approach to Administrative Law," 90 UNiv. PA. L. REV. 757 (1942); Jaffe, "The
Reform of Federal Administrative Procedure," 2 PUB. ADM. REv. 141 (1942);
Maurer, "An Analysis of the Bills Proposed by the Attorney General's Committee on
Administrative Procedure," 9 J.B. A. DIST. CoL. 6 {1942); Corry, "The Final
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each investigation has focused attention, spread knowledge, indicated
dangers, recommended safeguards, revealed weaknesses, suggested
remedies, and stimulated improvements in administrative procedure.
Three investigations have been particularly helpful: the Committee
on Ministers' Powers with its report and its accompanying Memoranda
Submitted by Government Departments and Minutes of Evidence; 62
the Attorney General's Committee with its report and its minority
views and recommendations and its accompanying monographs containing staff studies of twenty-seven separate federal agencies; 68 and now
Commissioner Benjamin with his report and accompanying detailed
memoranda containing studies of various boards, commissions and departments of the state of New York. Official investigators seldom
bolster their reports with references to earlier official investigators.
Throughout the Attorney General's Committee report and its minority
views and recommendations, however, there are indications that both
the majority and minority studied the reasoning and conclusions of the
Committee on Ministers' Powers, and the President's Committee on
Report of the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure and the
Report of the Committee on Ministers' Powers," 14 Miss. L. J. 393 (1942); Carr,
"Administrative Adjudication in America," 58 L. Q. REv. 487 (1942). For
comments upon mcfuographs prepared by the staff of the Attorney General's Committee, see Redford, Book Review, 18 TEX. L. REv. 535 (1940); Griswold, Book
Review, 41 CoL. L. REV. 362 (1940); Jennings, Book Review, 25 MINN. L. REv.
123 (1940); Neuhoff, Book Review, 26 WASH. UNIV. L. Q. 291 (1941); Rhyne,
Book Review, 89 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 1001 (1941).
62 The prevailing habit in America has been to ignore or belittle the reasoning
and conclusions of the Committee on Ministers' Powers. Montague, "Reform of Administrative Procedure," 40 M1cH. L. REV. 501 at 520, note (1942), and authorities
there cited. The notion that the committee found nothing wrong in British administrative procedure is refuted by the variety and cogency of the committee's criticisms
and comments. See COMMITTEE ON MINISTERS' PowERS REPORT 5, 6, 24, 41, 50,
54-70, 78-84, 88, 92-uo, u5-II8 (1932). The notion that the committee has had
no result in Great Britain is also• incorrect. See CARR, CoNCERNING ENGLISH AoMINISTRATIVE LAW 27-30, 115-116, 122-125, 175-176 (1941). Some of the committee's conclusions are debatable, particularly from the standpoint of American conditions, but they were the unanimous conclusions of the most distinguished group of
legislators, public officials and legal authorities that have ever joined in an official
investigation of administrative procedure. Referring in 1938 to the COMMITTEE ON
MINISTERS' PoWERS REPORT and the accompanying MEMORANDA SUBMITTED BY
GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS AND MINUTES OF EVIDENCE, Justice (then Professor)
Frankfurter stated that they "constitute, perhaps, the most illuminating analysis yet
formulated of those processes of government which are the stuff of administrative law."
Frankfurter, a foreword to a discussion of current developments in administrative
law, 47 YALE L. J. 515 at 518 (1938). For an extensive compilation of extracts from
and comments upon the COMMITTEE ON MINISTERS' PoWERs REPORT, see Montague,
"Reform of Administrative Procedure," 40 MicH. L. REv. 501 at 518-520 (1942).
63
REPORT OF ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE 3-6, 203-216 (1941).
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Administrative Management, and the Special Committee of the House
of Representatives that investigated the National Labor Relations
Board. Commissioner Benjamin's conclusions may be debatable, but
comparing his report point by point with all these earlier reports, it is
plain that on every disputed question Commissioner Benjamin has
weighed every argument pro and con contained in these earlier reports.
The Committee on Ministers' Powers Report was excelled by the Attorney General's Committee Report, and the latter is now excelled by
the Benjamin Report.64 These three successive reports have each contributed immeasurably to the improvement of administrative procedure. Continuing improvement can now be assured by continuing official investigation, through an Office of Federal Administrative Procedure as recommended by the majority and minority of the Attorney
General's Committee, and through a Division of Administrative Procedure in the Executive Department of the State of New York as recommended by Commissioner Benjamin.
64 These three_ reports are landmarks in administrative procedure. What is now
sorely needed is someone of discernment, knowledge· and literary skill sufficient to do
for administrative procedure today what was done for English constitutional law two
generations ago by A. V. DICEY, in his INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW
OF THE CoNSTITUTION (editions of 1885, 1886, 1889, 1893, 1897, 1902, 1908,
1915, 1939) and his LECTURES oN THE RELATION BETWEEN" LAW AND PUBLIC
OPINION IN ENGLAND DURING THE NINETEENTH CENTURY (editions of 1905, 1914)
and by F. W. MAITLAND in his 1887-1888 lectures at University of Cambridge post-·
humously published in his CoNSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND (1908).

